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INTRODUCTION
When contemporary legal theorists engage the question “What is
law?” their analyses typically are framed in terms of a grand contest
between legal positivism and natural law. In an encyclopedic entry
on “The Nature of Law,” Andrei Marmor observes:
In the course of the last few centuries, two main rival philosophi-
cal traditions have emerged, providing different answers to
[traditional] questions [regarding the nature of law]. The older
one, dating back to late mediaeval Christian scholarship, is
called the natural law tradition. Since the early 19th century,
Natural Law theories have been fiercely challenged by the legal
positivism tradition promulgated by such scholars as Jeremy
Bentham and John Austin.1
A recent text entitled The Nature of Law covers only the debate
between natural lawyers and legal positivists.2
These two hold pride of place in standard accounts of jurispru-
dence,3 standing above an unruly jumble of other theoretical ap-
proaches.4 A common arrangement in jurisprudence texts is to begin
with natural law and legal positivism, in that order, followed by
legal realism, and then a host of contemporary schools of thought.5
1. Andrei Marmor, The Nature of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 27, 2001),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lawphil-nature [http://perma.cc/JAD8-TVWL] (last updated
Feb. 25, 2011). Although he acknowledges sociological approaches, Larry Solum likewise
centers his analysis on natural law and the legal positivist school of thought. Larry Solum,
Legal Theory Lexicon 065: The Nature of Law, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (May. 11, 2005), http://
lsolum.typepad.com/legal_theory_lexicon/2008/05/legal-theory-le.html  [http://perma.cc/UD83-
89FM] (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).
2. THE NATURE OF LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN CONCEPTUAL JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL THEORY (Kenneth Einar Himma ed., 2011).
3. Id. at v.
4. See generally BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT (6th ed. 2012) (dis-
cussing various theories of jurisprudence as well as the debates surrounding those theories
that are presented in influential primary texts).
5. See, e.g., ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. ET AL., JURISPRUDENCE CLASSICAL AND CONTEM-
PORARY: FROM NATURAL LAW TO POSTMODERNISM (2d ed. 2002); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES
L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (rev. ed. 1990);
FREDERICK SCHAUER & WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: CLASSIC AND
CONTEMPORARY READINGS WITH COMMENTARY (1996).
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This ordering is chronological as well as thematic: natural law
theory began in classical times;6 legal positivism arose in the nine-
teenth century to challenge natural law;7 legal realism arose in the
1920s and 1930s to debunk formalist views of law;8 the Hart-Fuller
debate of the late 1950s marked the reenergizing of legal pos-
itivism;9 and in the 1970s, Dworkin challenged Hart’s dominance,10
law and economics examined law from an economic perspective,11
and critical legal studies of the radical left attacked mainstream
legal liberalism.12 Now we have a hodge-podge of descendants or
variations of these schools, with natural law and legal positivism
enjoying prominence above all others.
A third major pillar of jurisprudence exists, I argue in this Article,
and has existed for several centuries as a rival to natural law and
legal positivism, though it goes mostly unrecognized today owing to
the vagaries of labeling and intellectual fashion.13 Despite lacking
an acknowledged name and identity, several of the core propositions
of this theoretical stream are now virtually taken for granted—a
remarkable achievement for a theoretical perspective on law that
remains all but invisible.
Contrary to what the title might suggest, it is not my contention
that every existing legal theory can be squeezed into one of these
three jurisprudential approaches; nor do I claim that this is the only
way to categorize current theories about law.14 My claims are more
limited: this third theoretical stream constitutes a long-standing
and coherent alternative to natural law and legal positivism and the
theoretical discussion of law will benefit from recognizing it as
6. MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 12.
7. Id. at 19.
8. HAYMAN, JR. ET AL., supra note 5, at 159-60.
9. MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 36-39.
10. Id. at 39-46.
11. J.M. KELLY, A SHORT HISTORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 437-41 (1992).
12. MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 51-55.
13. An exception to this general treatment is RAYMOND WACKS, UNDERSTANDING JURIS-
PRUDENCE (3d ed. 2012). Wacks allocates a chapter to “Law and Social Theory” and a chapter
to “Historical and Anthropological Jurisprudence.” My treatment differs in that I unite these
schools within a single tradition, whereas he presents these as distinct approaches. A version
of the tradition I am referring to was also recently mentioned in Hanoch Dagan & Roy
Kreitner, The Character of Legal Theory, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 671, 675-77 (2011).
14. For a different three-part classification, see ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE:
AN INTRODUCTION (2011) (analyzing natural law, legal positivism, and critical legal studies).
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such.15 Recognition of this third branch of jurisprudence will create
a framework that facilitates the incorporation of insights currently
at the margins of discussions of the nature of law, including insights
about legal institutions, legal functions, legal efficacy, legal change,
legal practices, legal development, legal pluralism, legal culture,
and more.16 This jurisprudential tradition, labeled “social legal the-
ory” for reasons that will become evident, is characterized by a
consummately social view of the nature of law.17
I. THREE NINETEENTH-CENTURY RIVALS
I will first attempt to loosen the grip of conventional assumptions
by noting that legal theorists a century ago would have been sur-
prised by Marmor’s identification of only two great jurisprudential
rivals and also by the prominence he accords to natural law.18 As
Roscoe Pound wrote in 1911:
Until recently, it has been possible to divide jurists into three
principle groups, according to their views of the nature of law
and the standpoint from which the science of law should be
approached. We may call these groups the Philosophical School
[natural law], the Historical School, and the Analytical School.19
In the late nineteenth century, the historical school was equal in
stature to legal positivism,20 whereas natural law theory was mired
in a lengthy state of quietude.21 As legal historian J.M. Kelly put it:
If we scan the nineteenth century for any trace of the natural-
law belief which had survived from the ancient world until well
after the Reformation, being eclipsed only by the rational scien-
tific spirit of the Enlightenment, we will find it difficult to locate
anywhere outside the teaching of the institutional Catholic
15. See infra Parts V-VI.
16. See infra Part IX.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. Marmor, supra note 1.
19. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence, 24 HARV. L. REV.
591, 591 (1911). 
20. See Roscoe Pound, Book Review, 35 HARV. L. REV. 774, 774 (1921); see also Melville
M. Bigelow, A Scientific School of Legal Thought, 17 GREEN BAG 1, 1 (1905).
21. Bigelow, supra note 20, at 1.
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Church, which never abandoned the Aristotelian-Thomistic tra-
dition.22
This statement sweeps too broadly, for it ignores that natural law
thought was taught in the standard school curriculum during this
period,23 but Kelly is right that jurisprudents hardly write about
natural law theory.24
Natural law was in such disfavor in philosophical circles by the
end of the nineteenth century that it was occasionally suggested
that there was no reason to mount scholarly arguments against it.25
Renowned Oxford Professor James Bryce remarked in Studies in
History and Jurisprudence that “we now seldom hear the term Law
of Nature. It seems to have vanished from the sphere of politics as
well as from positive law.”26 For decades it remained dormant. An
article in 1915 noted, “[n]ow and again we are told that a revival of
the Law of Nature is in process or impending,” but continued, a
“new movement of this character ... can scarcely be [seen].”27 Lon
Fuller lamented in 1940 that natural law was then widely perceived
as “cobwebby illusion.”28 He wrote:
I believe that there is much of great value for the present day in
the writings of those thinkers who are classified, and generally
dismissed, as belonging to the school of natural law, and I regard
it as one of the most unfortunate effects of the positivistic trend
still current that it has contributed to bring about the neglect of
this important and fruitful body of literature.29
22. KELLY, supra note 11, at 333.
23. See KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 310-41 (1996).
24. See Jeremy Waldron, The Decline of Natural Right, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1790-1870) 623, 626-27 (Allen W. Wood & Songsuk
Hahn eds., 2012).
25. Id. Although natural rights thought is distinct from the natural law, the former grew
out of the latter, and both declined for related reasons. Id. at 640.
26. JAMES BRYCE, STUDIES IN HISTORY AND JURISPRUDENCE 604 (1901). Bryce identifies
four schools—Metaphysical (natural law), Analytical, Historical, and Comparative—the lat-
ter two being interconnected. Id. at 607-37. Frederick Pollock also describes the latter two as
intimately related, both grounded in Montesquieu and Maine. See Frederick Pollock, The
History of Comparative Jurisprudence, 5 J. SOC’Y COMP. LEGIS. 74, 75-84 (1903).
27. A.W. Spencer, The Revival of Natural Law, 80 CENT. L.J. 346, 346 (1915).
28. LON L. FULLER, LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 104 (1940).
29. Id. at 101.
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Historical jurisprudence was a formidable rival not just in eclip-
sing natural law for a time, but in mounting a powerful critique
against natural law:30 “All thinkers in the historicist tradition held
that the doctrine of natural law had illegitimately universalized the
values of eighteenth-century Europe as if they held for all epochs
and cultures.”31 Friedrich von Savigny, the nineteenth-century pro-
genitor of historical jurisprudence, offered the historical perspective
as an antidote to this natural law tendency: “The historical spirit,
too, is the only protection against a species of self-delusion, which
is ever and anon reviving in particular men, as well as in whole
nations and ages; namely, the holding that which is peculiar to
ourselves to be common to human nature in general.”32 Henry
Maine, another founding figure of historical jurisprudence, traced
this challenge to the mid-eighteenth century: “[T]he book of Mon-
tesquieu, with all its defects, still proceeded on that Historical
Method before which the Law of Nature has never maintained its
footing for an instant.”33
The conventional jurisprudential narrative dismisses these de-
tails of intellectual history by pointing to subsequent developments:
historical jurisprudence expired early in the twentieth century while
natural law theory revived after mid-century.34 “In the United
States, historical jurisprudence is considered to be dead,” wrote le-
gal historian and theorist Harold Berman.35 A leading jurisprudence
text proclaims, similarly, “historical jurisprudence has largely
disappeared.”36
That view, I will show in this Article, although superficially cor-
rect, is wrong in substance. Although the label fell into disuse, the
core theoretical propositions espoused by historical jurists, proposi-
tions that define the third stream of jurisprudence, carried on and
spread.37 These theoretical propositions did not originate with the
Historical School and are not exclusive to it.
30. See CHARLES GROVES HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 69-71 (1930).
31. FREDERICK CHARLES BEISER, THE GERMAN HISTORICIST TRADITION 13 (2011).
32. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND
JURISPRUDENCE 134 (Abraham Hayward trans., Littlewood & Co. 1831).
33. HENRY SUMMER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 91 (John Murray ed., 1920).
34. See MURPHY & COLEMAN, supra note 5, at 36-37.
35. Harold J. Berman, The Historical Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 13, 18 (2005).
36. BIX, supra note 4, at 276.
37. See infra Part IV.
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II. LAW AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION
Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws, published in 1748 to wide
acclaim, contains this fecund passage:
Laws must relate to the nature and the principle of the gov-
ernment that is established or that one wants to establish,
whether those laws form it as do political laws, or maintain it,
as do civil laws.
They should be related to the physical aspect of the country;
to the climate, be it freezing, torrid, or temperate; to the
properties of the terrain, its location and extent; to the way of
life of the peoples, be they plowmen, hunters, or herdsmen; they
should relate to the degree of liberty that the constitution can
sustain, to the religion of the inhabitants, their inclinations,
their wealth, their number, their commerce, their mores and
their manners; finally, the laws are related to one another, to
their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to the order of
things on which they are established. They must be considered
from all these points of view.38
“Law should be so appropriate to the people for whom they are
made,” he advised, “that it is very unlikely that the laws of one
nation can suit another.”39
Montesquieu set forth a descriptive and prescriptive account of
law as a social institution that fits its surrounding milieu, and ought
to match if the legal system and society are to function well. Law
is a social institution shaped by society and, in turn, shaping soci-
ety. Law is the product of and reflects the polity, religion, trade,
manners, moral views, customs, temperature, geography, and every-
thing else about and within a society, seen holistically. Sociologist
Emile Durkheim wrote that Montesquieu “saw quite clearly that all
these elements form a whole and that if taken separately, without
38. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 8-9 (Anne M. Cohler et al. eds. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) (1748).
39. Id. at 8. 
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reference to the others, they cannot be understood.”40 Montesquieu
highlighted “the interrelatedness of social phenomena.”41
In addition to his portrayal of law as a social institution, he set an
influential example by assuming a naturalistic-scientific perspective
on law, in contrast to current modes of philosophical or religious
speculation or idealization.42 He criticized Hobbes’s state of nature
and social contract theories as unwarranted and unnecessary
myths: human societies require no explanation.43 By nature, we are
social-sexual beings who live in communities.44 Law is best appre-
hended via scientific methods, gathering a large body of information
on historical and current societies, engaging in close observation of
facts, applying inductive and deductive reasoning, observing con-
nections and patterns, constructing ideal types, and formulating
general propositions about social-legal arrangements.45 Durkheim
credited Montesquieu as the theorist who “first laid down the funda-
mental principles of social science,”46 and “instituted a new field of
study, which we now call comparative law.”47
Writing in the heyday of Enlightenment natural law thought,
Montesquieu expressed a pluralistic vision that domesticated natur-
al law (in a manner of speaking): although reason is universal, legal
provisions cannot be uniform, he held, because what reason requires
of law varies owing to differences in surrounding context. It follows
from Montesquieu’s position that societies with different political-
economic-cultural-ecological complexes will have different condi-
tions and ends, and consequently, the law will be different in struc-
ture and content.48 David Hume, a philosopher-contemporary who
shared a naturalistic perspective, reinforced this seminal insight:
40. EMILE DURKHEIM, MONTESQUIEU AND ROUSSEAU: FORERUNNERS OF SOCIOLOGY 56
(1960).
41. Id. at 57.
42. Id. at 56-57.
43. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 38, at 6-7; see also Michael Zuckert, Natural Law, Natural
Rights, and Classical Liberalism: On Montesquieu’s Critique of Hobbes, 18 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y
227, 228 (2001).
44. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 38, at 6-7.
45. Isaiah Berlin, Montesquieu, in AGAINST THE CURRENT 130, 138-39 (Henry Hardy ed.,
2001).
46. DURKHEIM, supra note 40, at 61.
47. Id. at 51.
48. See Berlin, supra note 45, at 158.
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In general, we may observe, that all questions of property are
subordinate to the authority of civil laws, which extend, restrain,
modify, and alter the rules of natural justice, according to the
particular convenience of each society. The laws have, or ought
to have, a constant reference to the constitution of government,
the manners, the climate, the religion, the commerce, the situa-
tion of each society. A late author of genius [Montesquieu], as
well as learning, has prosecuted this subject at large, and has
established, from these principles, a system of political knowl-
edge, which abounds in ingenious and brilliant thoughts, and is
not wanting in solidity.49
Starting with the basic characteristics of human nature (social
beings, self-interested, limited benevolence to fellows) under condi-
tions of scarcity, Hume elaborated his own account of law as a
variable institutional arrangement that functions to benefit soci-
ety.50
Montesquieu’s perspective counters not only the universalism of
natural law theory, but also subtly pushes back against legal pos-
itivism. By locating the efficient causes of law in social forces, he
displaces the will of the lawgiver as the primary source of law.51
Philosopher Isaiah Berlin conveyed this thrust in an essay on
Montesquieu:
His whole aim is to show that laws are not born in the void, that
they are not the result of positive commands either of God or
priest or king; that they are, like everything else in society, the
expression of the changing moral habits, beliefs, general atti-
tudes of a particular society, at a particular time, on a particular
portion of the earth’s surface, played upon by the physical and
spiritual influences to which their place and period expose hu-
man beings.52
He emphasized that law develops organically in connection with the
needs of a changing society.53
49. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 93 (Tom L. Beau-
champ ed., 1998).
50. Id. at 83-103, 170-75.
51. DURKHEIM, supra note 40, at 40-44.
52. Berlin, supra note 45, at 153-54.
53. Id. at 156-57.
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Trained in law and having sat for a decade as a provincial
magistrate, Montesquieu understood law firsthand.54 He cautioned
that legislative enactments that clash with prevailing moral and
social norms may well fail and may require tyrannical force to be
effective.55 Judith Shklar wrote, on Montesquieu,
The lesson for legislators is that they must understand law first
of all as part of the social whole which they rule, as well as an
instrument of deliberate government. The spirit of the laws is
thus a mixture of intentional human designs and of the deep
circumstances which condition all rules of a society.56
His view of law and society has been criticized as overly determinis-
tic and conservative—a charge regularly leveled at holistic theories
of law and society—but, as Berlin noted, it also has been enlisted
“by social reformers and radicals as so many demands that the law
shall constantly respond to changing social needs and not be tied to
some obsolete principle valid only for some epoch dead and gone.”57
III. SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW AT THE CENTER OF HISTORICAL
JURISPRUDENCE
When historical jurisprudence emerged early in the nineteenth
century, Montesquieu’s insight stood at its core. Peter Stein, a rare
contemporary scholar who situates his work within historical juris-
prudence, makes this plain: “Nineteenth-century historical jurispru-
dence was founded on the connection between law and social and
economic circumstances.”58 Harold Berman presents the same
thrust:
[H]istoricists emphasize the source of the law that “is” and the
law that “ought to be” in the customs and traditions of the given
54. See JUDITH N. SHKLAR, MONTESQUIEU 1-5 (1987).
55. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 38, at 308-33; see also Berlin, supra note 45, at 155.
Montesquieu held to a strict view that judges interpreted the laws as written, and thus did
not extend the influence of social forces to the realm of judicial interpretation. Berlin, supra
note 45, at 154.
56. SHKLAR, supra note 54, at 69.
57. Berlin, supra note 45, at 156.
58. Peter Stein, The Tasks of Historical Jurisprudence, in THE LEGAL MIND: ESSAYS FOR
TONY HONORÉ 293, 304 (Neil MacCormick & Peter Birks eds., 1986).
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society—including both the previous decisions of its courts and
the scholarly writings of its jurists—contending that both the
meaning of legal rules and the meaning of justice are to be found
in the character, the culture, and the historical values of the
society.59
Friedrich von Savigny’s Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation
and Jurisprudence, published in 1814 to challenge the enactment of
a Civil Code for Germany, is the inaugural piece of historical ju-
risprudence. Savigny criticized the natural law “conviction that
there is a practical law of nature or reason, an ideal legislation for
all times and all circumstances,”60 and he criticized the legal posi-
tivist proposition that “all law, in its concrete form, is founded upon
the express enactments of the supreme power.”61 Against these
positions, he argued, law is the unplanned product of forces within
society:
In the earliest times to which authentic history extends, the law
will be found to have already attained a fixed character, peculiar
to the people, like their language, manners and constitution.
Nay, these phenomena have no separate existence, they are but
the particular faculties and tendencies of an individual people,
inseparably united in nature, and only wearing the semblance
of distinct attributes to our view.62
The source or “seat” of the law, he held, is the “common conscious-
ness of the people.”63 Law is “first developed by [the] custom[s] and
popular faith” of the people,64 then jurists work these into legal doc-
trine; law is produced “everywhere, therefore, by internal, silently-
operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver.”65 Savigny
credited Montesquieu with establishing that law is tied to the
unique circumstances of the people, and therefore diversity of law
among communities is to be expected.66
59. Berman, supra note 35, at 13-14.
60. SAVIGNY, supra note 32, at 23.
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 24.
63. Id. at 28, 24.
64. Id. at 28, 30.
65. Id. at 30.
66. Id. at 57-58.
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Owing to the multifarious connections between law and society,
Savigny insisted, it is folly to think that one could produce a new
Code that severs “all historical associations” and begins “an entirely
new life.”67 This is delusive not only because existing law grows out
of what came before but also because the thinking of jurists is
permeated by preexisting ways. Savigny wrote:
For it is impossible to annihilate the impressions and modes of
thought of the jurists now living,—impossible to change com-
pletely the nature of existing legal relations; and on this twofold
impossibility rests the indissoluble organic connection of genera-
tions and ages; between which, development only, not absolute
end and absolute beginning, is conceivable.68
This is not a rigidly conservative view. To the contrary, change
has a vital place within the historical perspective; it reminds us,
however, of “the element of continuity from past to future in the
development of the culture of a society, including its legal culture.”69
Society is constantly moving, and law with it. Savigny wrote:
But this organic connection of law with the being and character
of the people, is also manifested in the progress of the times; and
here, again, it may be compared with language. For law, as for
language, there is no moment of absolute cessation; it is subject
to the same movement and development as every other popular
tendency .... Law grows with the growth, and strengthens with
the strength of the people, and finally dies away as the nation
loses its nationality.70
Savigny’s theory of law has two central planks: law is the product
of society and law is constantly evolving in connection with changes
in society. Law, therefore, bears the indelible imprint of the history
of a society.71
67. Id. at 132.
68. Id.
69. Berman, supra note 35, at 18-19.
70. SAVIGNY, supra note 32, at 27.
71. This account, focusing on the connection between law and society, leaves out other
aspects of Savigny’s thought, in particular his assertion that legal concepts could be reduced
to a logical or geometrical system. See id. at 38-41.
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Henry Maine, the second great figure of historical jurisprudence,
writing in the second half of the nineteenth century, also explicitly
acknowledged Montesquieu’s influence (though not Savigny’s).72
Maine criticized both natural law and legal positivism for being
excessively abstract and for lacking historical awareness in their
speculations about law.73 He presented his work as scientific in
orientation, a theory of law grounded in evidence.
Maine focused on the organization of society and how this is
manifested in law. Primitive society, he observed, revolves around
families, which aggregate to form clans and tribes, which in turn
aggregate at higher levels of organization, all linked through a
common lineage; legal arrangements are determined by status re-
lations within the group.74 In contrast, modern society revolves
around individuals with legal relations determined through vol-
untary agreement. Hence his famous antithesis:
The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in
one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by
the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of
individual obligation in its place. The individual is steadily
substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take
account. The advance has been accomplished at varying rates of
celerity .... But, whatever its pace, the change has not been
subject to reaction or recoil .... Nor is it difficult to see what is
the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those
forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin
in the Family. It is Contract. Starting, as from one terminus of
history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of
Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to
have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all
these relations arise from the free agreement of individuals ....
[W]e may say that the movement of the progressive societies has
hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.75
72. See MAINE, supra note 33, at 133-34. 
73. See id. at 79-83, 123-29; see also PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN
IDEA 89-90 (1980); PAUL VINOGRADOFF, THE TEACHING OF SIR HENRY MAINE 4-6 (1904). For
an excellent study of Maine’s criticism of these schools, see Stephen G. Utz, Maine’s Ancient
Law and Legal Theory, 16 CONN. L. REV. 821 (1984).
74. See MAINE, supra note 33, at 131-37.
75. Id. at 163-65.
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Maine’s formulation expresses the inextricable connection between
law and society: the evolution of one is the evolution of the other,
aspects of one and the same process.
The challenge for modern legal systems, Maine wrote, is that
social mores change more swiftly than law, constantly generating a
gap between them. “Law is stable; the societies we are speaking of
are progressive. The greater or less happiness of a people depends
on the degree of promptitude with which the gulf is narrowed.”76
Three mechanisms are used to close this gap, listed in their histor-
ical order of appearance: “Legal Fictions, Equity, and Legislation.”77
The first two were utilized mostly undercover by judges, the third
openly by legislators.78
Maine’s discussion of legal fictions, penned in 1861, is preco-
ciously realistic. He observed that legal fictions are a device that
“conceals, or affects to conceal, the fact that a rule of law has un-
dergone alteration its letter remaining unchanged, its operation
being modified.”79 Maine says “affects to conceal” because lawyers
and judges are cognizant that the law has been changed—the fiction
is a knowing pretense. “We in England are well accustomed to the
extension, modification, and improvement of law by a machinery
which, in theory, is incapable of altering one jot or one line of
existing jurisprudence. The process by which this virtual legislation
is effected is not so much insensible as unacknowledged.”80 This
elaborate pretense allows the law to maintain its facade of stability
while judges make adjustments to legal doctrine beneath the sur-
face to keep pace with society.
Rudolph von Jhering, a German contemporary of Maine, cast
aside Savigny’s mystical “common consciousness” and his emphasis
on custom as the underlying source of law.81 Jhering instead
described legal development in terms of battles between competing
individuals and groups enlisting legal support to pursue their
76. Id. at 29.
77. Id. 
78. See id. at 32-34.
79. Id. at 30-31.
80. Id. at 35.
81. “It has been said of Ihering that he was at once the fulfilment [sic] and the end of the
historical school.” CARL JOACHIM FRIEDRICH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVE 154 (2d ed. 1963). 
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purposes and interests. Law is created and used instrumentally.
Jhering wrote:
In the course of time, the interests of thousands of individuals,
and of whole classes, have become bound up with the existing
principles of law in such a manner that these cannot be done
away with, without doing the greatest injury to the former ....
Hence every such attempt, in natural obedience to the law of
self-preservation, calls forth the most violent opposition of the
imperiled interests, and with it a struggle in which, as in every
struggle, the issue is decided not by the weight of reason, but by
the relative strength of opposing forces.82
Jhering optimistically opined that individual egoism (infused with
ethical notions) and social purposes combine in this process to give
rise to a legal order that benefits individuals and society overall.
A major legal figure in his day, though seldom mentioned by
jurisprudence scholars today, Jhering’s seminal contribution was to
articulate a thoroughly instrumental view of law that reflected the
new perceptions of the age, which would take over (independent of
Jhering) in the course of the twentieth century.83 He identified
instrumental resort to law as a crucial moving force behind the con-
stant evolution of law along with society. He too followed in the
footsteps of Montesquieu, as recognized in the exuberant opening
line of a review of his book, The Struggle for Law: “This is the title
of the most brilliant, original, and significant book on the genesis
and development of law since Montesquieu.”84
Jhering rejected social contract theories as fictional, offering
instead a bracing account of law as organized force: “Whoever will
trace the legal fabric of a people to its ultimate origins will reach
innumerable cases where the force of the stronger has laid down the
law for the weaker.”85 Hume said the same, remarking: “Almost all
the governments which exist at present, or of which there remains
any record in story, have been founded originally either on usurpa-
82. RUDOLPH VON JHERING, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW 10-11 (John J. Lalor trans., Hyperion
Press, Inc. 1979) (1915).
83. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
(2006).
84. The Struggle for Law, 20 ALB. L.J. 444, 444 (1879) (book review).
85. RUDOLPH VON IHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END 185 (Isaac Husik trans., 1914). 
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tion or conquest or both, without any pretense of a fair consent or
voluntary subjection of the people.”86 “Force produces law immedi-
ately out of itself,” Jhering contended, “and as a measure of itself,
law evolving as the politics of force. It does not therefore abdicate to
give the place to law, but whilst retaining its place it adds to itself
law as an accessory element belonging to it, and becomes legal
force.”87 Over time, law in many places evolves from an instrument
of the powerful to also impose limitations on the powerful, gaining
legitimacy in the process, though this does not occur to the same
degree everywhere, and even with this transformation force remains
integral to law.
Each of these nineteenth-century giants of historical jurispru-
dence held to Montesquieu’s holistic vision of law within society,
adding their own layer and wrinkle. Savigny promoted the organic
law-society image, situating society as the fount of law, and pointing
to the thinking of jurists as the key tether between collective con-
sciousness and law. Maine portrayed legal evolution and social
evolution as two sides of the same process, and explained how,
alongside legislation, judges change law to keep up with society.
Jhering discarded the image of law as an immanent ordering,
replacing it with law as an instrument that individuals and social
groups shape and utilize to advance their interests.
At its height in the final quarter of the nineteenth century, histor-
ical jurisprudence had cast natural law theory as prescientific and
made legal positivism appear narrow in light of the blooming
variety of past and present legal systems around the world.
IV. THE CONTINUITY OF SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE
The Historical School faded from the jurisprudential scene a-
round the turn of the twentieth century. Why it suffered this fate is
a matter of debate—a confluence of factors contributed. No system-
atic theory was articulated by its founders. Maine’s immediate
86. DAVID HUME, Of the Original Contract, in DAVID HUME’S POLITICAL ESSAYS 43, 47
(Charles W. Hendel ed., 1953). A number of contemporary anthropologists and political scien-
tists have also expressed versions of this view. See, e.g., Charles Tilly, War Making and State
Making as Organized Crime, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 169 (Peter Evans et al. eds.,
1985).
87. IHERING, supra note 85, at 187.
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jurisprudential successors, Frederick Pollock and Paul Vinogradoff,
failed to move it along.88 Jhering’s criticisms discredited Savigny.
Historical jurisprudence was a part of the general historicist
tradition in Germany, which declined in this period, suggesting that
broader intellectual factors played a role.89 Several legal theorists
and historians argue that historical jurisprudence was done in by its
association with evolutionary theory, which fell out of favor after the
nineteenth century when faith in inevitable human progress was
dashed by incessant social strife and the Great War.90 The turn of
the century, moreover, witnessed rapid and sweeping social change,
making a seemingly backward-looking jurisprudential school appear
less relevant and attractive;91 the explosion of new, hotly contested
economic, labor, and social welfare legislation and the growth of the
administrative state made talk about customs and organic growth
seem outdated.92
Why historical jurisprudence apparently expired, although inter-
esting to contemplate, distracts from the more consequential point
that the core theoretical views of law and society it advanced contin-
ued to thrive. Austrian jurist Eugen Ehrlich vigorously promoted
the selfsame cluster of positions in his 1913 text, Fundamental
88. Neil Duxbury suggests that historical jurisprudence, which he labels “comparative ju-
risprudence,” did not carry on within English jurisprudence because it lacked a distinctive
jurisprudential agenda. NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC
TRADITION 90-91 (2004). “These men [Maine, Vinogradoff, Pollock] may well have been Oxford
professors of jurisprudence, but their reflections on the subject were insufficiently well struc-
tured and focused to ensure that their own jurisprudential achievements would have lasting
appeal.” Id. at 91.
89. See FREDERICK C. BEISER, THE GERMAN HISTORICIST TRADITION (2011).
90. Calvin Woodward argues that historical jurisprudence collapsed in Anglo-America
owing to a combination of three factors: (1) the rejection of evolutionary ideas; (2) the rejection
of German ideas after World War I; and (3) the rejection of laissez-faire thought (with which
Maine was associated) with the rise of the social welfare state. See Calvin Woodward, A Wake
(or Awakening?) for Historical Jurisprudence, in THE VICTORIAN ACHIEVEMENT OF SIR HENRY
MAINE: A CENTENNIAL REAPPRAISAL 217, 220-28 (Alan Diamond ed., 1991); see also Stein,
supra note 58, at 296. Donald Elliot speculates that the absence of evolutionary theory from
jurisprudence between 1920 and 1970 was probably due to the backlash against Social Dar-
winism. E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
38, 59-60 (1985).
91. See Berman, supra note 35, at 17-19.
92. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Unrecognized Triumph of Historical Jurisprudence, 91
TEX. L. REV. 615 (2013) (reviewing DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY (2013)).
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Principles of the Sociology of Law.93 Identifying with Montesquieu,
Ehrlich asserted, “[a]s law is essentially a form of social life, it
cannot be explained scientifically otherwise than by the workings of
social forces.”94 Ehrlich also credits Savigny, writing,
In forming an estimate of the doctrines of Savigny and Puchta,
one must bear in mind that it was they who first introduced the
idea of development into the theory of the sources of law and
clearly saw the relation between the development of law and the
history of a people as a whole.95
A prominent theme in Ehrlich’s work was law’s vibrant interac-
tion with social forces, subject to ceaseless change.96 It notes that
“[t]he center of gravity of legal development therefore from time
immemorial has not lain in the activity of the state but in society
itself, and must be sought there at the present time.”97 Society is
constantly transforming and law with it. “The reason why the law
is in a perpetual state of flux is that men, whose relations the law
is designed to regulate, are continually posing new problems for it
to solve.”98 New legislation alters the law in an overt fashion, but
legal change is more extensively accomplished through judicial in-
terpretations using subtle distinctions and fictions that “put a new
picture into the old frame.”99 “Transformations of this sort, pregnant
with immeasurable consequences, are likely to be at work every
moment in affecting legal and social judgments concerning legal
relations; yet it might not be necessary on that account to change a
single line of the written law.”100 The agents on the front lines of
93. EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW (Walter Moll
trans., 1936).
94. Eugen Ehrlich, Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 582,
584 (1916).
95. EHRLICH, supra note 93, at 443.
96. See generally Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Vision of Social-Legal Change: Rescuing Ehrlich
from “Living Law,” 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 297 (2011).
97. EHRLICH, supra note 93, at 390.
98. Id. at 399.
99. Id. at 397; see also id. at 436-71.
100. Eugen Ehrlich, Judicial Freedom of Decision: Its Principles and Objects, in SCIENCE
OF LEGAL METHOD: SELECT ESSAYS BY VARIOUS AUTHORS 57 (Ernest Bruncken & Layton B.
Register trans., 1917); see also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 1-
30 (1928).
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legal change, in Ehrlich’s view, are the multitude of lawyers who
modify legal forms or draw up legal documents or construct new
legal arguments in order to meet novel social and economic de-
mands.101 Law is never in repose. “The great never-ending task of ju-
ristic science,” Ehrlich wrote, “is to resolve the conflict between the
changing demands of life and the words of the established law.”102
Ehrlich brought home the lesson that it is a mistake, commonly
committed by jurists, to view law in isolation: “[t]he problem is not
simply to know what a rule means, but how it lives and works, how
it adapts itself to the different relations of life, how it is being
circumvented and how it succeeds in frustrating circumvention.”103
Another prominent theme in Fundamental Principles was Ehr-
lich’s argument that social life is filled with multiple norm-governed
orders tied to social associations, which exist independently of the
state. This “living law,” as he famously called it, interacts with the
official law of the state, is often more efficacious than state law, is
a source of state law norms, and can give rise to a plurality of coex-
isting legal and quasi-legal orders.104 To apprehend the operation
and effect of state law, one must attend to the multiple normative
orders that saturate social arenas.
Ehrlich was neglected by continental jurists, but he found a
receptive audience in the United States. Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Roscoe Pound, and Karl Llewellyn were effusive about the book. In
correspondence with Frederick Pollock, Holmes called Fundamen-
tal Principles “the best book on legal subjects by any living continen-
tal jurist.”105 Pound declared in 1915 that “I think it is the best thing
that has been written recently.”106 He praised Ehrlich for showing:
[T]hat it is not enough to be conscious that the law is living and
growing, we must rather be conscious that it is a part of human
101. EHRLICH, supra note 93, at 341-45, 433.
102. Id. at 402.
103. Ehrlich, supra note 100, at 78.
104. See generally LIVING LAW: RECONSIDERING EUGEN EHRLICH (Marc Hertogh ed., 2009).
105. Stefan Vogl, Eugen Ehrlich's Linking of Sociology and Jurisprudence and the Recep-
tion of His Work in Japan, in LIVING LAW: RECONSIDERING EUGEN EHRLICH, supra note 104,
at 95-96 (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Dec. 29, 1919), in
2 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 34 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941)).
106. N.E.H. HULL, ROSCOE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 110 (1997) (quoting Letter from Roscoe Pound to Oliver Wendell Holmes
(July 22, 1915), in The Roscoe Pound Papers (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)).
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life. It is not merely that it should look upon nothing human as
foreign to it, in a sense everything human is a part of it.107
Llewellyn confessed that when he found Ehrlich, he was “somewhat
crushed in spirit, because [Ehrlich] had seen so much.”108
The conventional jurisprudential narrative has historical juris-
prudence dying and being supplanted by sociological jurispru-
dence.109 This is incorrect. They are strains of the same jurispru-
dential tradition;110 rather than expiring, as many have repeated,
the former seamlessly morphed into the latter.111 Paul Vinogradoff’s
Introduction to Historical Jurisprudence, published in 1920, ranges
across history, psychology, sociology, economics, and political theory
as they bear on social-legal development. Roscoe Pound witnessed
this transformation: “At first this wider historical jurisprudence was
thought of as a comparative ethnological jurisprudence. But it was
not long in assuming the name and something of the character of a
sociological jurisprudence.”112 A French legal philosopher at the time
also perceived their core identity: “Like the historical school, [the
sociological school] considers law in its evolution, in its successive
changes, and connects these changes with those which are experi-
enced by society itself.”113 Philosopher Michael Oakeshott likewise
remarked, “[b]oth these interpretations [economic and “sociological
theories of the nature of law”] share, in part, the presuppositions
107. Id. at 108-09 (quoting Letter from Roscoe Pound to Oliver Wendell Holmes (July 22,
1915), in The Roscoe Pound Papers (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)).
108. Id. at 291 (quoting Karl Llewellyn, Appendix on Allocation of Responsibility [for THE
CHEYENNE WAY], in The Karl Llewellyn Papers (on file with the University of Chicago Law
School Library)).
109. See, e.g., supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
110. It is important to emphasize that beyond the social theory of law that is the focus of
this Article, the historical jurists and sociological jurists differed in several respects. They
were of different generations, and the former tended to be more conservative, favoring slower
more organic legal change, whereas the latter tended to advocate rapid change through
legislation. See Berman, supra note 35, at 18-19.
111. For a fuller elaboration of this argument, see Tamanaha, supra note 92, at 628-29. 
112. Pound, supra note 19, at 614. Although he is describing the German wing, Pound
noted that a similar expansion had occurred in the English branch. Id. at 614-15 n.79.
113. Joseph Charmont, Recent Phases of French Legal Philosophy, in MODERN FRENCH
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 65 (Arthur W. Spencer ed., Franklin W. Scott & Joseph P. Chamberlain
trans., 1916). Charmont observes that the sociological school also took from utilitarianism the
notion that institutions are a “means of satisfying social interests.” Id. What all these schools
share is opposition to natural law theory. Id. at 69-70.
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which determine the character of historical jurisprudence, and
therefore cannot be distinguished from it absolutely.”114
The connection between historical and sociological theories of law
extends back to Montesquieu. He saw law as the product of the
history of a society, and he combined history and sociology in his
methodology. As Carl Becker described it, Montesquieu surveyed
“the ideas, customs, and institutions of all peoples at all times and
in all places, to put them side by side”;115 he plumbed historical
knowledge to construct ideal types of basic social arrangements,
then analyzed what he found in sociological terms.116 Isaiah Berlin
noted that Montesquieu’s account of law as the product of society “is
the foundation of the great German School of historical jurispru-
dence” and “various modern sociological theories of law.”117
V. SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW WITHIN LEGAL REALISM AND
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT
The theoretical ideas about law championed by historical juris-
prudence not only carried on in sociological jurisprudence, they
continued to spread, ultimately to become widely and deeply en-
trenched. The Common Law, by Oliver Wendell Holmes, exudes this
same perspective:
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The
felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political
theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even
the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have
had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining
the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies
the story of a nation’s development through many centuries.118
114. MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, THE CONCEPT OF A PHILOSOPHICAL JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS AND
REVIEWS, 1926-1951, at 151 (2007).
115. CARL L. BECKER, THE HEAVENLY CITY OF THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PHILOSOPHERS
100 (1932). 
116. See JOHN ALAN BAUM, MONTESQUIEU AND SOCIAL THEORY 97-119 (1979); ERNST
CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 209-16 (Fritz C.A. Koelin & James P.
Pettegrove trans., 1951).
117. Berlin, supra note 45, at 154.
118. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
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More than a decade earlier Jhering had made a similar observa-
tion:
Let us break the charm, the illusion which holds us captive. All
this cult of logic that would fain turn jurisprudence into legal
mathematics is an error and arises from misunderstanding law.
Life does not exist for the sake of concepts, but concepts for the
sake of life. It is not logic that is entitled to exist, but what is
claimed by life, by social intercourse, by the sense of justice—
whether it be logically necessary or logically impossible.119
Holmes, much like Jhering, described the process of legal recogni-
tion as a struggle between competing individual and social interests
(though Jhering has a more optimistic spin). Holmes wrote:
This tacit assumption of the solidarity of the interests of society
is very common, but seems to us to be false.... [I]n the last resort
a man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his neighbors.
And this is as true in legislation as in any other form of corpo-
rate action.... [W]hatever body may possess the supreme power
for the moment is certain to have interests inconsistent with
others which have competed unsuccessfully. The more powerful
interests must be more or less reflected in legislation; which, like
every other device of man or beast, must tend in the long run to
aid the survival of the fittest.120
Legislation “is necessarily made a means by which a body, having
the power, put[s] burdens which are disagreeable to them on the
shoulders of somebody else.”121 Holmes wrote that “it is no sufficient
condemnation of legislation that it favors one class at the expense
of another; for much or all legislation does that; and none the less
when the bona fide object is the greatest good of the greatest num-
ber.”122
More than any other American jurist, Pound is identified with
sociological jurisprudence, owing to The Scope and Purpose of
119. PAUL VINOGRADOFF, INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 142 n.1 (1920)
(quoting RUDOLPH VON IHERING, GEIST DES ROMISCHEN RECHTS, III, at 302 (1866)). 
120. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Gas-Stoker’s Strike, 7 AM. L. REV. 582, 583 (1873).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 584.
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Sociological Jurisprudence, his two-part elaboration and advocacy
article in the Harvard Law Review.123 Pound presented law in
thoroughly functionalist terms:
I am content to think of law as a social institution to satisfy
social wants—the claims and demands and expectations in-
volved in the existence of civilized society—by giving effect to as
much as we may with the least sacrifice, so far as such wants
may be satisfied or such claims given effect by an ordering of
human conduct through politically organized society.124
Observing law over the arc of history, Pound saw “a continually
more efficacious social engineering.”125
Legal philosopher Morris Cohen, the father of legal realist
Felix Cohen, wrote in 1915 that judges are constantly modifying
the law—common law, statutes, and the Constitution—through
creative interpretation that amounts to judicial legislation.126 “These
changes,” Cohen noted, “have been necessitated by the changed
conditions of industrial and commercial life and the courts have
consciously or unconsciously changed the law accordingly.”127 Cohen
was critical of “two contradictory absolutistic conceptions of what is
law. One is that the law is the will of the sovereign and the other
that law is eternal reason or immutable justice.”128 Although both
notions are informative when softened and not framed as oppo-
sites, in practice law must be apprehended and evaluated as an in-
strument to achieve social ends. “The issue,” Cohen wrote, “is not
between a fixed law on the one hand, and social theories on the
other, but between social theories unconsciously assumed and so-
cial theories carefully examined and scientifically studied.”129
The legal realists also had a thoroughly social view of law. On his
list of legal realist propositions, Karl Llewellyn declared: “(1) The
123. Roscoe Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence (pts. 1 & 2), 24
HARV. L. REV. 591 (1911), 25 HARV. L. REV. 140 (1912).
124. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 47 (rev. ed. 1954).
125. Id.
126. See Morris R. Cohen, The Process of Judicial Legislation, 48 AM. L. REV. 161 (1914).
127. Morris R. Cohen, Legal Theories and Social Science, 25 INT’L J. ETHICS 469, 476
(1915); see Cohen, supra note 126, at 169.
128. Cohen, supra note 127, at 482.
129. Id. at 485.
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conception of law in flux, of moving law, and of judicial creation of
law. (2) The conception of law as a means to social ends and not as
an end in itself; ... [and] (3) The conception of society in flux, and in
flux typically faster than law.”130 Llewellyn named Ehrlich as an
early exemplar of realist jurisprudence.131 Both gave primacy to
judges as a vehicle through which law is altered to keep up with
social changes. Similar to Ehrlich, he wrote:
It is society and not the courts which gives rise to, which shapes
in the first instance the emerging institution; which kicks the
courts into action. It is only from observation of society that the
courts can pick their notions of what needs the new institution
serves, what needs it baffles.... In any event, if the needs press
and recur, sooner or later recognition of them will work into the
law. Either they will induce the courts to break through and
depart from earlier molds, or the bar will find some way to put
new wine in old bottles and to induce in the bottles that elastic-
ity and change of shape which, in the long run marks all social
institutions.132
These ideas are now associated with legal realism. Sociological and
historical jurisprudence articulated them decades earlier.133
Judge Benjamin Cardozo likewise emphasized that law is contin-
ually engaging with social developments, writing that law’s constant
task is to manage “permanence with flux, stability with progress.”134
Cardozo wrote:
We live in a world of change. If a body of law were in existence
adequate for the civilization of today, it could not meet the
demands of the civilization of tomorrow. Society is inconstant. So
long as it is inconstant, and to the extent of such inconstancy,
130. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236 (1931).
131. See Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431,
454 (1930).
132. K. N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY 55
(1930).
133. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 758-59
(2009). 
134. CARDOZO, supra note 100, at 6.
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there can be no constancy in law. The kinetic forces are too
strong for us.135
A great deal of legal change, Cardozo insisted, necessarily and
legitimately is accomplished by judges.136 When business customs
change such
that a rule of law which corresponded to previously existing
norms or standards of behavior, corresponds no longer to the
present norms or standards ... then those same forces or tenden-
cies of development that brought the law into adaptation to the
old norms and standards are effective, without legislation, but
by the inherent energies of the judicial process, to restore the
equilibrium.137
The same is true of social mores. “The moral code of each gener-
ation, this amalgam of custom and philosophy and many an
intermediate grade of conduct and belief, supplies a norm or stan-
dard of behavior which struggles to make itself articulate in law.”138
The “pressure of society on the individual mind,” he observed, “is
ever at work in the making of the law declared by courts.”139
Common to all these depictions of law is an implicit understand-
ing of the social nature of law.140 “What is certain,” Cardozo pro-
claimed in 1928, “is that the gaps in the [legal] system will be filled,
and filled with ever-growing consciousness of the implications of the
process, by a balancing of social interests, an estimate of social
values, a reading of the social mind.”141
An elaborate modern rendering of ideal-type law-society clusters
was presented in Law in Modern Society by Roberto Unger, a lead-
ing philosopher of critical legal studies. “A society’s law constitutes
the chief bond between its culture and its organization; it is the
135. Id. at 10-11.
136. Id. at 7-8.
137. Id. at 14-15.
138. Id. at 17.
139. Id.
140. Not all theorists who saw law in social terms extended this insight to judicial decision
making. Montesquieu in particular described judging as if the judge was strictly interpreting
the law. See SHKLAR, supra note 54, at 88.
141. CARDOZO, supra note 100, at 77.
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external manifestation of the embeddedness of the former in the
latter.”142
Each of the forms of social life discussed in this book—tribal,
aristocratic, and liberal society, or the postliberal, the tradition-
alistic, and the revolutionary socialist variant of modernity—is
a meaningful whole of the most comprehensive kind. Each
embodies an entire mode of human existence. And for each the
law plays a crucial role in revealing and determining the
relationship of belief to organization.143
Two decades later, Unger would back away from this ideal-type
presentation.144 The rapid transformation brought on by late-
twentieth-century economic globalization made it obsolete. And
Unger eschewed the conservative connotation that attaches to the
notion of society and law as coherent wholes, preferring instead to
emphasize the mutability of legal-social arrangements.145 But his
vision of law as a social institution produced by, and engulfed in,
social forces remained. “[T]he law is the product of real collective
conflict,” wrote Unger, “carried on over a long time, among many
different wills and imaginations, interests and visions.”146
Many legal theorists today would assent to this statement, which
harkens back to Jhering and Holmes. A range of contemporary
theoretical approaches implicitly presume that law is an instrument
to achieve individual and social purposes infused with, and buffeted
by, social forces.147 Law and economics theory posits law as a means
142. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF
SOCIAL THEORY 250 (1976).
143. Id. at 252.
144. See ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 2-6
(1996) (“The failure to imagine transformative possibility that has come to vitiate the
dominant practice of social and historical study infects normative political philosophy as well
as the shared language of practical politics.”).
145. See id. at 126-28 (“The idea of law as the expression of a unique form of life drastically
exaggerates the unity and continuity, and understates the made-up character, of the cultures
manifest in law.”).
146. Id. at 65.
147. See TAMANAHA, supra note 83, at 118-32 (describing the legal theories of economic
analysis of the law, critical legal studies, the law and society movement, legal pragmatism,
and the formal version of the rule of law, and the fact that each builds upon the view that law
is a means to an end).
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to maximize wealth.148 Critical theorists argue that beneath a facade
of neutrality, law fundamentally serves and enforces social hierar-
chies of power, whether economic, gender-based, or racial. Legal
pragmatism connotes “a rejection of the idea that law is something
grounded in permanent principles and realized in logical manipula-
tion of those principles, and the determination to use law as an
instrument for social ends.”149
What complicates the jurisprudential picture is that many
modern legal theorists accept the core legal positivist insight that
law is whatever legal officials validly declare,150 as well as the core
insights of historical and sociological jurisprudence about the social
nature of law and the instrumental use of law.151 Accordingly, it can
be said of legal realism, law and economics, critical legal studies,
and others, that they partake of both jurisprudential traditions—
each highlighting a key aspect of law in its own way that resonates
with jurists.
Major elements of the social theory of law, as this chronicle
shows, are nigh taken for granted within the legal culture today.
Donald Elliott observed twenty years ago that the notion that law
evolves in connection with society is “deeply ingrained,” though its
original theoretical provenance has been forgotten.152 “We speak of
the law ‘adapting’ to its social, cultural, and technological envi-
ronment without the slightest awareness of the jurisprudential
tradition we are invoking.”153 Along the same lines, legal historian
Robert Gordon recently remarked that evolutionary functionalist
“theory and its accompanying narrative [has] dominated Western
thinking about the relation between law and social change for the
last two centuries, although in strictly legal writing the theory is
usually inexplicit: it lurks as a set of background assumptions
rather than being explicitly set forth and argued for.”154
148. Id. at 118-20.
149. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 405 (1995).
150. See Berman, supra note 35, at 13.
151. See supra note 147.
152. Elliott, supra note 90, at 38.
153. Id.
154. Robert W. Gordon, “Critical Legal Histories Revisited”: A Response, 37 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 200, 202 (2012).
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VI. SOCIAL LEGAL THEORY
Thus far, I have presented an alternative intellectual history to
counter the conventional jurisprudential narrative. Henceforth I
will refer to the third branch of jurisprudence as “social legal theo-
ry.” Another fitting label would be “social historical legal theory,”
with a nod to both theoretical strains that embody it, but I prefer
“social legal theory” for concision and because variations of it
already circulate.155
Let me now offer a few clarifications. A social “perspective” or
“orientation” toward law, or widely held “background assumptions”
about the social nature of law, do not amount to a theory of law. A
theory of law consists of explicitly formulated propositions about
what law is and what law does. Several of the theorists mentioned
above offered a theory of law in this sense, at least to some extent,
but not all did.
Although not theories in themselves, widely held background
assumptions lie at the heart of all theories about law. Legal
positivism embodies the commonsense recognition that law is
whatever legal officials enforce as law regardless of whether it is
bad in content or consequence.156 Natural law theory is built on
common beliefs that law is (or should be) just, and that morality is
objective (in some sense).157 Social legal theory is grounded on the
widespread perception that law is a social institution, with social
influences and consequences, that is used instrumentally.158
The connection between background beliefs and theories is large
because theories themselves are social products inextricably linked
to existing social views, practices, and circumstances. Pound ob-
served:
For jurists and philosophers do not make these theories as sim-
ple matters of logic by inexorable development of philosophical
155. Law and society scholars frequently use the labels “socio-legal” or “sociolegal.”
156. See Berman, supra note 35, at 13.
157. See Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L.
REV. 44, 46-47 (1941) (describing natural law theory as deriving its doctrine from the
assumption that what is just can be objectively determined by human reason or the will of
God).
158. See supra Part IV.
2015] THE THIRD PILLAR OF JURISPRUDENCE 2263
fundamentals. Having something to explain or to expound, they
endeavor to understand it and to state it rationally and in so
doing work out a theory of what it is. The theory necessarily
reflects the institution which it was devised to rationalize, even
though stated universally.159
Theories of law wax and wane and have shifting emphases subject
to developments at the time and place of their formulation. This
includes broad influences like a period of social turmoil or rapid
social change, as well as more immediate influences within intel-
lectual settings in which legal theories are developed, such as aca-
demic specialization, institutional support, and current scholarly
norms or fads.
It is critical to see that a jurist (or citizen) can adhere to all three
sets of background beliefs simultaneously without contradiction or
inconsistency—she can believe that legal rules are legally valid even
when immoral, that law should be just and some moral norms are
objectively right, and that law is a social institution utilized to
achieve ends. Indeed this combination of beliefs is probably com-
mon. Only when these beliefs are framed at higher levels of abstrac-
tion and counter-posed as opposing theoretical positions with
defining elements do incompatibilities arise.
The failure to mark the distinction between theories of law and
background assumptions has been a fertile source of confusion. Us-
ing adherence to the assumption underlying legal positivism as his
criterion for inclusion, for example, Lon Fuller categorized Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., the legal realists, and sociologists of law
(including Ehrlich) as legal positivists, even though they did not
explicitly align themselves with legal positivism.160 Theorists still
debate whether Holmes was a legal positivist,161 and whether the
legal realists can be seen as legal positivists.162 Assertions like these
are prone to commit the basic error of thinking that a jurist who
159. POUND, supra note 124, at 30.
160. See FULLER, supra note 28, at 45-59.
161. See FREDERIC R. KELLOGG, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., LEGAL THEORY, AND
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT (2007) (challenging the notion that Holmes was a legal positivist).
162. See, e.g., Danny Priel, Were the Legal Realists Legal Positivists?, 27 LAW & PHIL. 309
(2008); Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054 (1995)
(describing the evolution of legal positivism in the United States, and comparing it to legal
realism).
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holds the background assumption contained within a theory also,
therefore, subscribes to the higher-level theory. This promotes
confusion, as just explained, because a jurist can accept one or more
background assumptions without necessarily committing to the
theory which centers on those assumptions.
To preempt this misunderstanding, I should clarify that I do not
claim that all legal realists or contemporary legal scholars who
implicitly hold evolutionary-functionalist-social views of law count
as social legal theorists. My objective, rather, was to trace out ideas
about the social nature of law that were central to historical and
sociological jurisprudence, and to show how widespread these ideas
have become independent of the theories that initially promoted
them.163
The current situation is precisely that law is widely seen in social
terms, but with no recognized jurisprudential tradition to match.164
Background beliefs about law do not require an accompanying
theory to thrive, obviously, yet this theoretical vacuum leaves us to
carry on without the benefit of advances in understanding that well
formulated theories potentially bring.
Another essential clarification is that social legal theories are a
branch of jurisprudence. Multiple contrasting social theories of law
exist, not just those I mentioned earlier, from theorists as diverse as
Max Weber, Niklas Luhmann, and Julius Stone,165 and among
contemporary jurisprudents such as William Twining, Roger Cot-
terrell, Lawrence Friedman, and David Trubek.166 Social legal theo-
ries proffer concepts of law, theories about the origins of law and
163. See supra Parts II-IV (discussing how the principles of historical jurisprudence were
integrated into sociological jurisprudence, which in turn became engrained in jurisprudence
theories); see also supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
164. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
165. See MAX RHEINSTEIN, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein
ed., Edward Sihls & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954); JULIUS STONE, THE PROVINCE AND
FUNCTION OF LAW: LAW AS LOGIC, JUSTICE, AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1950); Niklas Luhmann,
Operational Closure and Structural Coupling: The Differentiation of the Legal System, 13
CARDOZO L. REV. 1419, 1425 (1992) (“The legal system itself is an inseparable part of the
societal system.”).
166. See generally ROGER COTTERRELL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE (Univ. of Pa. Press
1989); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE (1975);
WILLIAM TWINNING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVE (2009); David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An Essay on the Study
of Law and Development, 82 YALE L.J. 1, 1-2 (1972).
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functions of law, theories about the institutional nature of law,
theories about the social forces that shape law, and much more.167
Because social legal theorists disagree among themselves on funda-
mental points, it is not possible to present a detailed list of shared
theoretical propositions.
The broad range and sheer diversity of social theories of law has
contributed to obscuring that they fall within a single jurispru-
dential branch. The functionalist assumptions within Montes-
quieu,168 for example, are different from the cultural explanations
of Savigny,169 which are yet again different from the instrumental
explanation of Jhering.170 Sociological jurisprudents, in their polit-
ical views, tended to be critical of historical jurisprudents for their
antipathy to radical legislative reform.171 This diversity might be
invoked as an argument against squeezing them under a single
jurisprudential umbrella, especially considering that certain theo-
rists, most prominently Maine and Weber, are major figures outside
jurisprudence in fields like sociology, anthropology, and political
science172 (although it bears mention that Weber was trained in law,
worked for several years as a lawyer, and initially taught law).173
Natural law theory, however, is in the same condition. Radically
diverse approaches coexist within the natural law tradition, includ-
ing the Catholic branch represented by St. Thomas Aquinas and
John Finnis, Lon Fuller’s proceduralism, Michael Moore’s meta-
physical realism, and Ronald Dworkin’s unique law as integrity, to
167. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY
1-3 (2001) (testing, exploring, and elaborating on the thesis that “law is a mirror of society,
which functions to maintain social order”).
168. See supra notes 38-57 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 30-71 and accompanying text.
170. See UNGER, supra note 144, at 123-28; supra notes 81-87.
171. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
172. See, e.g., Charles F. Keyes, Weber and Anthropology, 31 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY
233, 233 (analyzing Weber’s effect on English-speaking anthropologists, as opposed to his
often analyzed influence in political science and sociology); Henry Orenstein, The Ethnological
Theories of Henry Sumner Maine, 70 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 264, 264 (synthesizing Maine’s
social, political, and legal theories in order to understand his influence on modern
anthropology). Some of the most interesting current theorizing about law as a social institu-
tion is coming out of evolutionary thought taking place in political science and anthropology.
See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER (2011) (analyzing the origins
of law and the social forces that have brought them to their contemporary state).
173. See STEPHEN P. TURNER & REGIS A. FACTOR, MAX WEBER, THE LAWYER AS SOCIAL
THINKER 2-7 (1994).
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mention a few natural law theories that have little in common.174
Along with jurisprudential strains worked out in law departments,
natural law theory is developed in philosophy, political theory, and
theology departments.175
Legal positivism is likewise internally riven by disputes among
competing positivist theories—a gulf separates Hartian and Kelsen-
ian positivists176—although the range of disagreement among
positivists is narrower. The more limited diversity within legal
positivism is perhaps explained by the fact that only legal theorists
(and not even most of them) appear to be interested in the questions
that occupy analytical jurisprudents; in contrast, natural law and
social legal theory entertain issues taken up by an assortment of
theorists from other disciplines.177
Like the other two major traditional branches of jurisprudence,
there is no single or dominant social legal theory. The common
thread that unites this jurisprudential tradition can be pared down
to two propositions: law is social in nature and is best understood
through an empirically-focused lens.
VII. THREE CONTRASTING-COMPLEMENTARY ANGLES ON LAW
This last observation raises another sense in which these three
jurisprudential streams represent genuine theoretical alternatives.
Natural law takes a normative angle on law.178 Legal positivism
takes a conceptual or analytical angle on law.179 Social legal theory
174. An overview of this diversity is provided in Jonathan Crowe, Natural Law Beyond
Finnis, 2 JURISPRUDENCE 293, 294 (2011) (discussing the natural law theories of Aquinas and
Finnis, Fuller, Moore, and Dworkin while clarifying “the relationship between the core claims
of the new natural outlook and the more specific views of individual authors”). For a
discussion of a range of existing teories, and advocating the addition of progressive natural
versions, see WEST, supra note 14, at 12-59.
175. See Crowe, supra note 174, at 297 (“[C]ontemporary natural law scholarship has
become splintered between distinct academic fields.”).
176. See H.L.A. Hart, Kelsen Visited, 10 UCLA L. REV. 709 (1963) (critiquing Kelsen’s work
and delineating between their respective positions).
177. See supra notes 172, 175 and accompanying text.
178. See Kelsen, supra note 157, at 46-48 (stating that most individuals in a society agree
on morals and values, and the doctrine of natural law is derived from that idea).
179. See Sebok, supra note 162, at 2070-71 (stating that Pound’s criticism of analytical
jurisprudence targeted two of three central elements of positivism).
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takes an empirically oriented angle on law.180 To put it another way:
natural law is grounded in moral philosophy, legal positivism in
analytical philosophy, and social legal theory in science. I invoke
“science” expansively to encompass history, economics, sociology,
anthropology, psychology, political science—any approach with an
empirical focus grounded in observation, evidence, verification,
falsification, induction, deduction, data gathering, and other such
methods. The term “angle” denotes that, although each stream has
its own distinctive center, they are not mutually exclusive compart-
ments. When not pushed to antagonistic extremes, these three
orientations balance one another, which prompted Morris Cohen to
declare (too brashly), “[n]o great individual jurist ever belonged
exclusively to the analytic, historical, or philosophical school.”181 All
three have normative implications; all three engage in conceptual
analysis; all three accept that law is a social institution.
A century ago this tripartite division was well known. “Jurispru-
dence, in its specific sense as the theory or philosophy of law,” wrote
John Salmond, “is divisible into three branches, which may be dis-
tinguished as analytical, historical, and ethical.”182 Salmond noted
that most jurisprudence texts dealt primarily with one or another,
but insisted that “[t]hese three aspects of the law ... are so involved
with each other that the isolated treatment of any one of them is
necessarily inadequate.”183 In the mid-twentieth century, Julius
Stone divided jurisprudence into three main branches: “Analytical
Jurisprudence;” “Sociological (or Functional) Jurisprudence;” and
“Theories of Justice (or Critical or Censorial or Ethical) Jurispru-
dence.”184
Legal philosopher Hans Kelsen presented the same triangulation.
“The limits of this subject [analytical jurisprudence] and its cogni-
tion must be clearly fixed in two directions: the specific science of
law, the discipline usually called jurisprudence, must be distin-
guished from the philosophy of justice, on the one hand, and from
180. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
181. MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 347
(1933).
182. JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 4 (7th ed. 1924).
183. Id. at 5.
184. JULIUS STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 31-32 (1950).
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sociology, or cognition of social reality, on the other.”185 In Kelsen’s
breakdown, analytical jurisprudence focuses on law as a normative
system with its own criteria of validity;186 natural law is about
principles of justice or morality;187 sociological jurisprudence, which
he associated with the “American legal realists,”188 looks at what
law actually does.189 Kelsen was antagonistic to natural law
theory,190 but he was not entirely hostile to sociological jurispru-
dence though it had no place in his theory of law.
The pure theory of law by no means denies the validity of such
sociological jurisprudence, but it declines to see in it, as many of
its exponents do, the only science of law. Sociological jurispru-
dence stands side by side with normative [analytical] juris-
prudence, and neither can replace the other because each deals
with completely different problems.191
Absent social legal theory, the third branch argued for in this
piece, theoretical discussions about the nature of law are missing an
essential alternative perspective.192 Natural lawyers and legal posi-
tivists take angles on law that limit their ability to plumb the full
range of theoretical insights that can be derived from placing the
social nature of law at the center of the inquiry.193
185. Kelsen, supra note 157, at 44.
186. Id. at 50-52.
187. Id. at 46-47.
188. Id. at 52 n.2.
189. Id. at 52.
190. Id. at 45-49.
191. Id. at 52. Although he identified his theory with analytical jurisprudence, Kelsen uses
the term “normative jurisprudence” to label his “pure theory of law” because his theory
focuses on law as a system of norms. As Hart observed, this choice of labels was a source of
confusion. Hart, supra note 176, at 712-13.
192. Oakeshott argued that each of these positions was incomplete in different respects,
and he hoped that they could be superseded by a more comprehensive theory of law. He
specifically faulted analytical jurisprudence for its overly abstract bent: “It is clear, I think,
that a philosophical enquiry into the nature of law would very soon apprehend the incomplete-
ness of the explanation of the nature of law offered in an analytical jurisprudence and would
make the best of its way to something less abstract.” OAKESHOTT, supra note 114, at 173-74.
193. Harold Berman argues that each branch “has isolated a single important dimension
of law, and it is both possible and important to bring the several dimensions together into a
common focus. Harold J. Berman, Toward an Integrative Jurisprudence: Politics, Morality,
History, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 779 (1988).
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Analytical jurisprudence and natural law have large blind spots
owing to their lack of attention to social context and their failure to
attend to the historical dimension of law.194 For example, analytical
jurisprudents can tell us about the elements of the rule of law, but
they say nothing about how the rule of law develops within a soci-
ety. They also typically exclude from their purview the myriad ways
in which “pressures in society” infuse legislation and judge-made
law, and they do not examine legal consequences.195 Many jurists,
furthermore, have noted that the enduring challenge law faces is to
reconcile legal stability with social change, which analytical juris-
prudence and natural law do not address. “[S]ocial necessities and
social opinion are always more or less in advance of Law,” Maine
observed.196 “We may come indefinitely near to the closing of the gap
between them, but it has a perpetual tendency to reopen.”197 As
Morris Cohen put the dilemma, “It would thus seem that life
demands of law two seemingly contradictory qualities, certainty or
fixity and flexibility; the former is needed that human enterprise be
not paralyzed by doubt and uncertainty, and the latter that it be not
strangled by the hand of the dead past.”198 Owing to its ongoing flow
within fixity, law is constantly being made anew inside and on top
of the old and existing—the old sometimes serving as a sturdy
foundation or a recalcitrant drag. “A system of law at any time,”
Holmes wrote, “is the resultant of present notions of what is wise
and right on the one hand, and, on the other, of rules handed down
from earlier states of society and embodying needs and notions
which more or less have passed away.”199
Natural law and analytical jurisprudence say little about these
prominent features of law. The former is silent because universal
natural principles are timeless and unchanging. The latter neglects
194. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
195. See Edwin W. Patterson, Hans Kelsen and His Pure Theory of Law, 40 CALIF. L. REV.
5, 7 (1952) (these comments are directed at Kelsen but apply to analytical jurisprudents gen-
erally).
196. MAINE, supra note 33, at 23.
197. Id.
198. COHEN, supra note 181, at 261. Cohen’s writings on judicial changes in the law are
reminiscent of Maines’s analysis of legal fictions. See Cohen, supra note 126; see also Cohen,
supra note 127.
199. COHEN, supra note 181, at 208 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL
PAPERS 156 (1921)).
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them because social forces are outside the positivist focus on legally
recognized mechanisms of legal change (internal rules of recognition
and change), and social influences and consequences are too messy
and empirically sensitive and variable to be amenable to analytical
treatment. The two main acknowledged traditions in contemporary
jurisprudence, consequently, are not interested in and are incapable
of addressing the dynamic engagement of law in society.
In his account of the task of legal positivism, Marmor recognizes
that law must be understood as one among other social institutions:
Law is not the only normative domain in our culture; morality,
religion, social conventions, etiquette, and so on, also guide
human conduct in many ways which are similar to law. There-
fore, part of what is involved in the understanding of the nature
of law consists in an explanation of how law differs from these
similar normative domains, how it interacts with them, and
whether its intelligibility depends on such other normative
orders, like morality or social conventions.200
This seems to suggest that legal positivism extends out to the arena
of social legal theory, but typically it aims at isolating and distin-
guishing the legal system; whereas, looking in the opposite direc-
tion, social legal theorists pay close attention to law’s connections to
the surrounding social domain.
Interestingly, social legal theory can incorporate natural law and
legal positivist theories themselves within its own framework. On
the opening page of his classic work, The Concept of Law, Hart
writes, “[n]otwithstanding its concern with analysis the book may
also be regarded as an essay in descriptive sociology.”201 Although
legal philosophers have downplayed this assertion ever since, social
legal theories take it seriously, producing sociologically oriented
accounts of legal positivist notions like the social sources thesis, the
separation thesis, primary and secondary rules, the internal view,
and legal validity.202 Natural law theory itself can be examined as
a social-legal phenomenon—as a set of beliefs about law that are
200. Marmor, supra note 1.
201. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, at v (1961).
202. This application, for example, reveals that the separation thesis of legal positivism
should be extended beyond morality to include functionality as well. See Brian Z. Tamanaha,
Socio-Legal Positivism and a General Jurisprudence, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2001).
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acted upon in ways that affect the world.203 As Max Weber observed,
natural law is “sociologically relevant only when practical legal life
is materially affected by the conviction of the particular ‘legitimacy’
of certain legal maxims, and of the directly binding force of certain
principles which are not to be disrupted by any concessions to
positive law imposed by mere power.”204 John Finnis took pains to
distinguish natural law principles, which he claimed exist outside
of history, from natural law discourse, which has a long history with
actual social consequences, good and bad.205 Natural law theory oc-
cupies itself with the former, while social legal theory takes up the
latter. Legal positivism and natural law are thus reframed through
the social legal theory lens.
VIII. “BUT IT’S NOT PHILOSOPHY OF LAW”
The empirical-scientific bent of social legal theory prompts an
objection to my argument. Natural law and legal positivism are
entitled to their elevated status as theoretical approaches to the
nature of law, it might be said, because only they are philosophical.
Legal positivists have been especially prone to express this position,
as in this passage by Joseph Raz:
Since a legal theory must be true of all legal systems the identi-
fying features by which it characterizes them must of necessity
be very general and abstract. It must disregard those functions
which some legal systems fulfill in some societies because of the
special social, economic, or cultural conditions of those societies.
It must fasten only on those features of legal systems which they
must possess regardless of the special circumstances of the socie-
ties in which they are in force. This is the difference between
legal philosophy and sociology of law. The latter is concerned
with the contingent and with the particular, the former with the
necessary and the universal. Sociology of law provides a wealth
203. For a recent example of this perspective on human rights, see LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN,
THE HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE: A STUDY IN HISTORY AND CONTEXT (2011). Another example is
George Herbert Mead, Natural Rights and the Theory of the Political Institution, 12 J. PHIL.
PSYCHOL. & SCI. METHODS 142 (1915). 
204. MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 866 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
For a systematic presentation of natural law as a social phenomenon, see TAMANAHA, supra
note 167, at 133-205.
205. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 24-25 (2d ed. 2011).
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of detailed information and analysis of the functions of law in
some particular societies. Legal philosophy has to be content
with those few features which all legal systems necessarily
possess.206
Other leading legal positivists have echoed this stance. Scott Sha-
piro declares:
Social sciences cannot tell us what the law is because it studies
human society. Its deliverances have no relevance for the legal
philosopher because it is a truism that nonhumans could have
law. Science fiction, for example, is replete with stories involving
alien civilizations with some form of legal system.... Social
scientific theories are limited in this respect, being able to study
only human groups, and hence cannot provide an account about
all possible instances of law.207
Ponder the oddity of a legal philosopher declaring that social-
scientific theories, because they are limited to human societies, are
irrelevant to legal philosophy. Earlier generations of philosophers
were not so dismissive. Salmond, an analytical jurisprudent, con-
sidered analytical, historical, and ethical jurisprudence to be
informative “branches” within the “philosophy of law.”208 Oakeshott
described historical and sociological jurisprudence as full-fledged
versions of “philosophical jurisprudence,” alongside analytical juris-
prudence and natural law. He recognized that they undertook the
same basic task, albeit from different perspectives, writing:
Neither analytical jurisprudence nor historical jurisprudence
accept law in the character in which it first appears to them;
both are attempts to expound the nature of law by relating law
as it first appears to some general principle and in this way
transforming and making fuller our view of the nature of law.209
206. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 104-05 (2d ed. 2009).
207. SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 406-07 (2011). Ironically, just as legal philosophers
declare the irrelevance of social science, we witness the opposite tendency of scientists deny-
ing the relevance of philosophy. See Austin L. Hughes, The Folly of Scientism, 37 NEW
ATLANTIS 32 (2012), available at http://perma.cc/Q5F6-JK6T. On all sides, this has the feel
of intellectual border patrolling and one-upmanship.
208. SALMOND, supra note 182, at 4.
209. OAKESHOTT, supra note 114, at 158.
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In 1966, philosopher Martin Golding published The Nature of Law:
Readings in Legal Philosophy using the same three-part division.210
No certain or agreed-upon criteria delimit what counts as “philos-
ophy of law,” which has changed in scope and orientation over time.
Raz and Shapiro apply unusually and unduly constrictive defining
criteria that would exclude much that has been considered to be
within legal philosophy in the past. In this Article, I have mentioned
prominent philosophers—Hume, Berlin, Shklar, Oakeshott, and
Cohen—who positively discuss theories of the social nature of law.
Contemporary philosopher John Searle is engaged in constructing
“a new branch of philosophy that might be called ‘The Philosophy of
Society,’ ”211 involving philosophical analysis of social institutions,
with extensive discussions of law that overlap with subjects ad-
dressed by social legal theorists.
Raz’s and Shapiro’s exclusionary stance is premised on the
assumption that the defining feature of legal philosophy is concep-
tual analysis that produces universalistic, necessarily true claims
about the nature of law.212 A like-minded, analytical jurisprudent
explains that their theory of law must “consist of propositions about
the law which are necessarily true, as opposed to merely contin-
gently, true,” because “only necessarily true propositions about law
will be capable of explaining the nature of law.”213 This self-imposed
demand guarantees an abstract, stripped-down, sterile theory of law
because little (if anything) is necessarily and universally true about
any social institution.
210. THE NATURE OF LAW: READINGS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (Martin P. Golding ed., 1966).
For his third branch, alongside natural law and legal positivism, Golding uses readings from
legal realism and sociological jurisprudence, not historical jurisprudence. A recent text of the
same name (different subtitle), in contrast, contains readings only from natural law and legal
positivism. See THE NATURE OF LAW: PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN CONCEPTUAL JURISPRUDENCE
AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 2.
211. See JOHN R. SEARLE, MAKING THE SOCIAL WORLD: THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN
CIVILIZATIONS 5 (2010); see also JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY
(1995).
212. This assertion is criticized in Frederick Schauer, On the Nature of the Nature of Law
(May 9, 2011) (discussion draft), available at http://perma.cc/8MRL-VGUD; see also Frederick
Schauer, The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie Dickson, 25 OXFORD
J. LEGAL STUD. 493 (2005).
213. JULIE DICKSON, EVALUATION AND LEGAL THEORY 18 (John Gardner ed., 2001)
(emphasis added).
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Their claimed detachment from social science, however, inescap-
ably stumbles over the root reality that law is a social institution.
It is for this reason that, beneath the elaborate philosophical
trappings, theories of law that legal philosophers construct look
much the same as theories of law that social legal theorists
produce.214 Take Shapiro’s theory of law: “what makes the law,
understood here as a legal institution, the law is that it is a self-
certifying compulsory planning organization whose aim is to solve
those moral problems that cannot be solved, or solved as well,
through alternative forms of social ordering.”215 His theory of law
consists of two elements: form (compulsory planning organization)
and function (solving complex moral problems). Social theories of
law typically are constructed using variations of the same two
elements.
To see the similarity, compare Shapiro’s theory of law with an
influential sociological concept of law formulated by Max Weber:
“The term ‘guaranteed law’ shall be understood to mean that there
exists a ‘coercive apparatus,’ i.e., that there are one or more persons
whose special test is to hold themselves ready to apply specially
provided means of coercion (legal coercion) for the purpose of norm
enforcement.”216 When devising his concept of law, Weber reformu-
lated state law in abstract terms, paring away its nonessential
features. Shapiro did the same, after setting up his analysis with
philosophical talk of self-evident intuitions. Their respective con-
cepts differ on the surface because they have different opinions
about what is essential to law and how best to frame it, but each
produces an abstraction of the form of state law (institutionalized
coercion/organized compulsory system), and each posits law’s core
function (enforcing norms/norm-based planning).
Analytical jurisprudents and social legal theorists produce simi-
lar-looking theories of law because they are working from the same
material: socially constructed manifestations of law. They can be
214. An extended demonstration of this similarity is in Brian Z. Tamanaha, What is
“General Jurisprudence”?: A Critique of Universalistic Claims by Philosophical Concepts of
Law, 3 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 287 (2012).
215. SHAPIRO, supra note 207, at 225.
216. MAX WEBER, WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 13 (Max Rheinstein ed., 1954).
Weber meant his formulation to be an ideal type, rather than a definition. For an overview,
see Brian Z. Tamanaha, Analytical Map of Social Scientific Approaches to the Concept of Law,
15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 501 (1995).
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compared against one another and judged superior or inferior, and
their range of application is identical. There is no categorical
distinction between the theories of law they construct.
For legal philosophers who remain unpersuaded, my argument
that social legal theory is a third major jurisprudential tradition
holds up even if the philosophy/not philosophy demarcation is grant-
ed. Jurisprudence is more capacious than legal philosophy.217 The
insistence that legal philosophy is a distinct subtype of jurispru-
dence does not deny that social legal theory is a coequal branch of
jurisprudence.
IX. WHY IT MATTERS
Legal theory discussions revolve around schools of thought de-
fined by characteristic theses clashing with opposing schools espous-
ing contrary theories (or subtheories), frequently presented in stock
narratives: the legal realists debunked the formalists; critical legal
studies attacked liberal legalism; textualists challenge pragmatists;
originalists and living constitutionalists square off; natural lawyers
and legal positivists have fought for several centuries.
Without an acknowledged name and identity, a theoretical per-
spective practically does not exist. Historical jurisprudence is all but
forgotten; sociological jurisprudence is sometimes mentioned but
rarely engaged; theoretical work on law and society is relegated to
a nethermost region at the border of the social sciences, or stuck in
the law and society movement, cabined off from jurisprudence.
A leading contemporary jurisprudence text by Brian Bix exempli-
fies this virtual erasure.218 Bix travels expansively across the juris-
prudential terrain, exploring many theoretical nooks and crannies
and mounting sophisticated discussions of civic republicanism and
game theory, among a multitude of other well-known and obscure
theory topics; he even spends a chapter on law and literature.219 He
does not discuss sociological jurisprudence at all, however, men-
tioning the name once in connection with Pound.220 He allocates
217. See Roger Cotterrell, Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy, 5 JURISPRUDENCE
1, 41 (2014).
218. BIX, supra note 4.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 194.
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page-length treatment to historical jurisprudence in the “Other
Approaches” chapter, noting its demise.221 Legal sociology and law
and society are dispensed with in a short paragraph at the close of
a chapter on “critical perspectives”:
The application of sociology to law, known variously as “socio-
legal studies”, “law and society”, and “law in context”, has a long
history of offering empirically grounded critiques of current laws
and legal practices, and suggestions for change. While sociology
aims to be descriptive and morally neutral, many of those who
identify with this approach have “progressive” or radical views,
and so these movements have often been thought of as more
“critical” than scientific.222
No mention is made of Jhering or Ehrlich in the text. Savigny and
Maine get a few quick words on the historical jurisprudence page.223
Weber shows up in a handful of footnotes,224 Unger in a single
note.225 Cicero gets greater coverage from Bix than all of them
combined.226 There is no discussion of the social nature of law or
holistic views of law within society.
An astute and learned jurisprudent, Bix is not to be faulted for
his noncoverage, which accurately reflects the general disregard
within jurisprudence of the social legal theorists canvassed in this
Article. Jurisprudence proper leaves most of this out.227 Among legal
theorists who do think about these issues, the lion’s share of
attention goes to legal realists—anointed authority figures in U.S.
academic-legal culture—with little awareness of the rich theoretical
veins that lie unseen and untapped beneath the realists’ under-
standing of law.
221. Id. at 275-76.
222. Id. at 253.
223. Id. at 275.
224. Id. at 13, 37, 42, 71.
225. Id. at 254, 239.
226. Id. at 68.
227. Raymond Wacks, whose jurisprudence text includes chapters on historical and soci-
ological jurisprudence, confides that a reviewer of the manuscript for the publisher “urged me
to eliminate altogether” these chapters “because they were ‘mainly empirical’—and insuf-
ficiently intellectual.” WACKS, supra note 13, at 317. Although Wacks notes that a second
reader wanted those very chapters expanded, the majority of jurisprudence texts reflect the
views of the first reader.
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Having no name means getting no recognition and no coverage.
The label social legal theory gives an identity to a coherent theoreti-
cal perspective that was once prominent and lives on as implicit
background assumptions, but is now neglected by legal theorists.
This is just a start. The parameters of this jurisprudential branch
must be made concrete and filled in through the construction of
theories that illuminate the social nature of law, building on
predecessors like Ehrlich and Weber, as well as more recent con-
tributors. With a name and identity, theorists with a social-legal
orientation can locate their work within a shared tradition, perceiv-
ing and constructing common links with others, critically engaging
in ways that prompt further insights and development within the
tradition. A name and identity will also help sharpen the differences
between natural law, legal positivism, and social legal theory as
alternative theoretical standpoints, promising, perhaps, to advance
beyond the well-worn debate between the former two. Work now
excluded from jurisprudence—like theories of law and development
or legal pluralism—will be drawn into jurisprudence by the social-
legal focus.
Law is a social institution, after all. The poverty of contemporary
jurisprudence is its marginalization of theories that center on and
explore this fundamental insight about law.
